

**UWE
Bristol**

University
of the
West of
England



CASUGOL

Nights Out

Presentation by
Dr. Phil Legg

**Associate
Professor in
Cyber Security**

**MSc Cyber
Security
Programme
Leader**

Cyber Security, AI and Digital Futures

September 2020





About Me



- Programme Leader for NCSC-certified MSc Cyber Security
- Director of UWEcyber
- Research interests:
 - Cyber security, Machine Learning, Data Visualisation
- Research domains:
 - Insider threat detection, cyber situational awareness, adversarial AI, privacy-preserving AI, visualisation for explainable AI, cyber resilience






MSc Cyber Security (NCSC Full Certification)
BSc Cyber Security and Digital Forensics

NCSC EmPowerCyber

CISSE UK

Cyber Security, AI and Digital Futures

What do we mean by Cyber Security?



CYBER SECURITY




*Cyber Security is the protection of **Confidential, Integrity, Availability**, on any digital assets – including data, systems, and processes*

What do we mean by AI?


- A system that can learn?
- Not explicitly programmed by the developer?
- Learning from example data?

Two common tasks:

- Classification – given an input, can a function be learnt to **distinguish between discrete classes** (e.g., animals).
- Regression – given an input, can a function be learnt to **predict a continuous value** (e.g., stock market).



A Neural Network is a function that can learn




AI for Cyber Security

Classification


- Malware analysis – software – **malicious or benign**
- Intrusion detection systems – network traffic - **malicious or benign**

Regression

- Threat scoring – behavioural analysis – 0 to 1?
 - Use of language, Use of resources, etc.
- Offers scalability for big data analysis
- Can help security analyst identify attributes that may be missed / overlooked
- Rapid decision-making to respond to threats



A Neural Network is a **function** that can learn




AI for Cyber Security

Traditional AI systems do not assume for an adversary that wants to ruin our day!


Adversarial Learning

- Given a classifier, can we compromise the input or compromise the learnt model weights, to trigger an unintended output?
- Images: Panda / Gibbon, Duck / Horse examples
- Audio: Speech recognition *Shouting through letterboxes: A study on attack susceptibility of voice assistants*
- Impact: Can we therefore attack voice assistants, or can we impact how CAVs identify road objects?
 - Is this a 'cyber attack'?



AI for Cyber Security

Traditional AI systems do not assume for an adversary that wants to ruin our day!



Deep Fakes

- Transfer learning – given a model, can we compromise this so that a different input will yield the same output (or a very similar output)?
- Mis-information – sophisticated social engineering
 - Is this a 'cyber attack'?

AI for Security - Security of AI

- AI can be an effective tool for modern cyber security analysis
 - Network traffic, software, behaviour analysis, threat detection
 - Scalable, consistent big data analysis – better than human?
- AI is also vulnerable to attacks, so how do we have security of AI?
 - E.g., Adversarial learning, Deep Fakes
 - Requires better forms of explainable AI for assessing security properties / model edge cases / decision boundaries and better forms of human-machine collaboration
 - How to validate this for models that continually learn?
- **CAVs, IIoT, Cyber Crime prevention, HealthTech** – AI is being used for all of these – if the AI is insecure then they could have serious societal consequences
 - are these new 'cyber attack' vectors?



UWEcyber Research Stories


1 Cyber Security in Connected Autonomous Vehicles

To what extent do CAVs introduce additional risk compared to traditional road vehicles?

Can the perceived cyber risks in CAVs be mitigated against?

Project CAVForth “Cyber Security Assessment”

Penetration Testing on a CAV Stagecoach Bus Service across Edinburgh Forth Road Bridge



An Example Problem: Breaking the Brakes ...

Braking has become **Digital** and ‘Complicated’



Successful Cyber Attacks Against Braking Systems :

- Contradictions that may arise in the data stream
- Denial of Service – Cycles, processing out of bounds, timing
- Non Determinism – Arbitration between Complex Algorithms with no ground truth
- Transition Analog / Digital
- Interaction between technologies e.g. error correction as input to ML
- Attack Detection & Attack Management (Function and Control)

Method: Attack under controlled conditions

Without direct connection between controls and function, our assumption of ASIL-D becomes questionable – even before malevolent attacks are considered



2 Protection from Cyber-enabled and Cyber-dependent Crime



Twitter says hackers downloaded private account data


18 July 2020

Facebook Twitter Email Share



Twitter has confirmed hackers made use of tools that were supposed to have only been available to its own staff to carry off Wednesday's hack attack.

The breach saw the accounts of Barack Obama, Elon Musk, Kanye West and Bill Gates among other celebrities used to tweet a Bitcoin scam.



Bc1qxy2kgdygjrsqtzq2n0yrf2493p83kkfjhx0wlh

£100k in approx. 2 hours

Hackers hijack government websites to mine crypto-cash

11 February 2018

Facebook Twitter Email Share



The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) took down its website after a warning that hackers were taking control of visitors' computers to mine cryptocurrency.

Security researcher Scott Helme said more than 4,000 websites, including many government ones, were affected.



How do we better detect, analyse, and respond, to cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes?

Anti-money Laundering
Counter-Terrorism Financing
Dark Web




3 AI Security

- Explainable AI, Adversarial ML, and Privacy-Preservation in ML
- 3 current PhD candidates addressing these themes related to AI and Security
 - 1. How can we interrogate AI to ensure it performs as intended?
 - 2. What about when an adversary or unexpected input occurs?
 - 3. How do we achieve this whilst protecting privacy of individuals, without compromising accuracy?



TECHMODAL
Opportunities. Found.



4 Malware, IoT, 5G

- Can we detect and dynamically defend against active malware? (NODENS)
- Can context-aware malware characteristics be interrogated using sandbox environments? (MORRIGU)
- Can we safely examine malware propagation to deploy dynamic deception networks to inform analysis? (NCSC)
- How do we examine and protect IoT devices? How do we convey IoT device activity for non-expert users to help them defend themselves? (NCSC)
- What are the security implications of 5G network slicing? (MaaStran)





Figure 3 Screenshot to show an example of live monitoring in the MORRIGU GUI (left) when the Ryuk Ransomware has been deployed using MORRIGU within the Windows 10 testing environment (right).






5 Cyber Foundry

- Practical Hands-On Experience for Student-Industry Engagement
- **Industrial Penetration Testing** Project with VQ Communications (3rd yr Student)
- Research facility suitable for 50:50 studentship model
- Training facility for running “capture the flag” exercises with industry and outreach partners



CISSE^{UK}





Thank you for listening



Dr Phil Legg

Associate Professor in Cyber Security

Phil.Legg@uwe.ac.uk

<http://www.plegg.me.uk>

<http://go.uwe.ac.uk/phil>



AI for Cybersecurity

Further reading on AI for Cybersecurity

- <https://www.ibm.com/uk-en/security/artificial-intelligence>
- <https://www.computing.co.uk/sponsored/3063441/ai-is-changing-cybersecurity-but-its-not-a-catch-all-solution>
- <https://blog.eccouncil.org/the-role-of-ai-in-cybersecurity/>
- <https://www.balbix.com/insights/artificial-intelligence-in-cybersecurity/>
- <https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-improve-cybersecurity-for-artificial-intelligence/>